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RESPONSE

CATCH-ALL DOCTRINALISM
AND JUDICIAL DESIRE

ANYA BERNSTEINt

In response to Carlos M. Vizquez & Stephen I. Viadeck, State Law,
the Westfall Act, and the Nature of the Bivens Question, 161 U. PA. L. REV.
509 (2013).
INTRODUCTION

Courts confronting Bivens' claims-damages suits for constitutional
violations committed by federal employees-like to note that the remedy
is hanging on for dear life. Supreme Court Justices have stated that Bivens
should be a thing of the past. 2 Appeals courts, in dicta, have described the
threshold for dismissing a Bivens claim as "remarkably low."3 One court
has even suggested that Bivens remedies, which vindicate constitutional
rights when a statutory cause of action is not available, should be allowed

t Bigelow Fellow and Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to
Alexander Boni-Saenz, Aziz Huq, and Laura Weinrib for helpful comments.
1 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
2 See, e.g., Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 568 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Bivens is a
relic of the heady days in which this Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of action."
(quoting Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring))). Of course,
Bivens itself was a reaction to the Court's earlier assumption of common law powers to expand official
immunity. See Anya Bernstein, CongressionalWill and the Role ofthe Executive in Bivens Actions: What
Is Special About Special Factors?,45 IND. L. REV. 719, 727 (2012) ("As people's practical ability to sue
errant federal actors diminished, the Bivens Court reintroduced a remedy that had been universally
available when the Constitution was written."). The Justices who object to Bivens have never
explained how they distinguish it from other exertions of common law power.
3 E.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 574 (2d Cir. 2009).
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only when a statutory cause of action is available.4 Bivens is not dead yet:
Fourth Amendment violations that reprise Bivens itselfs and Eighth
Amendment violations by federally employed officials, 6 remain solid
candidates for relief.7 But when cases depart from these prototypical
scenarios-and especially when they arise out of national security projects-courts are reluctant to hear them.
In a provocative new article, Professors Carlos Vizquez and Stephen
Vladeck suggest that courts dismiss these cases because judges believe
that "extending" Bivens into any "new context" instantiates disfavored
judicial lawmaking.8 But, they argue, these judges have it backwards:
most often, it is refusing to recognize a Bivens claim that constitutes
judicial lawmaking. 9 Recognizing one, in contrast, furthers the law
Congress has made.10 Focusing on Bivens's peculiar place in federalism
and federal law, Vizquez and Vladeck demonstrate that the logic of

4 See id. at 581 (stating that once Congress has "enact[ed] legislation that includes enumerated
eligibility parameters, delineated safe harbors, defined review processes, and specific relief to be
afforded[,] . . . then the courts . . . will be able to . . . provide judicial oversight").
S Bivens involved a warrantless search of a home and an arrest that did not lead to prosecution,
403 U.S. at 389, rendering the exclusionary rule inapplicable.
6 Carlson v. Green held that constitutional damages suits could be brought directly against
federal prison guards. 446 U.S. 14, 23 (1980). In 2012, the Supreme Court declined to recognize a
constitutional damage remedy against privately employed prison guards working at a federal
prison because, as private employees, the guards were subject to common law liability under
California tort law. Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 626 (2012).
7 See Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its Consequencesfor
the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 842 (2010) ("[If Bivens claims survive [sua
sponte judicial] screening, their rate of success is somewhere in between the . . . success rates for
prisoner civil rights litigation and nonprisoner civil rights litigation.").
8 Carlos M. Vizquez & Stephen I. Vladeck, State Law, the Westfall Act, and the Nature of the
Bivens Question, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 518 n.34, 524-26 (2013). What constitutes an "extension"
into a "new context" therefore becomes a central debate. Compare, e.g., Arar, 585 F.3d at 572
(concluding that the "context" of the lawsuit was "extraordinary rendition," which was a "new
context" for a Bivens action), with id. at 583, 597 (Sack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(arguing that "Arar's allegations do not present a 'new context' for a Bivens action," insofar as they
are premised on procedural and substantive due process violations by federal agents). For an
argument that courts should explicitly decide whether a suit requires an extension of Bivens before
deciding whether one is warranted, see Alexander A. Reinert & Lumen N. Mulligan, Asking the
First Question: Reframing Bivens After Minneci, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013)
(manuscript at 22-25), availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2042175.
9 See Vazquez & Vladeck, supra note 8, at 527 (asserting that "the displacement of common
law remedies against federal officials would be just as much a legislative function as the creation of
new federal rights of action," and noting that "the status quo at the time of Bivens recognized the
availability of common law remedies against federal officials").
10 See id. at 530 ("[R]ecognition of a new federal right of action would merely supplement[-rather than displace-]state law.").
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courts' own legal interpretations suggests expanding Bivens remedies, yet
courts paradoxically choose to narrow them instead.
Why, and how, does that happen? Courts claim to reject Bivens actions out of passive virtue and institutional competence concerns.
Vizquez and Vladeck focus on the former. But neither justification fully
explains the situation. Examining how courts justify their Bivens dismissals-through a results- oriented conflation of doctrines -reveals that the
outcome drives the reasoning. That outcome is to insulate the Executive
from those individuals it harms.
I. JUDICIAL ACTIVISM:
CLOSING A DOOR Is ALSO AN ACT

Vizquez and Vladeck's main thrust is that courts misunderstand what
constitutes judge-made law in the Bivens context. Because there is no
statutory right to damages for constitutional violations by federal employees,
courts must decide whether to recognize each particular Bivens claim. 12
Recent appeals court cases assume that a plaintiff seeking Bivens relief has
no other avenue of redress, and ask whether the plaintiff is entitled to any
remedy at all." In contrast, the Supreme Court has generally asked whether
a constitutional remedy should be available in addition to those remedies
provided under state law.14 The question a Bivens claim raises is thus not
whether there ought to be a remedy, but whether afederal remedy is preferable to existing state remedies.s
The state law path was complicated in 1988 by the Westfall Act, which
made the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) the "exclusive" remedy for torts
committed by federal actors, unless the suit was "brought for a violation of
the Constitution of the United States."' 6 Courts usually interpret the
Westfall Act as foreclosing state lawsuits for constitutional harms by federal
n Id. at 516.
12 Bernstein, supra note 2, at 719; see also James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking
Bivens: Legitimacy and ConstitutionalAdjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117, 121 (2009) (arguing that courts
should presume a Bivens action is available, which would constitute a "fundamental change in the
way courts evaluate the viability of a Bivens claim").
13 Vizquez & Vladeck, supra note 8, at 519-23.
14 See id. at 542-48 (noting that in Bivens, although the majority and dissent disagreed as

to whether common law damage remedies were adequate, all nine Justices assumed they were
available); see also id. at 513 n.16 (citing Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 620 (2012), as the
latest iteration of this approach).
15 See id. at 512 (noting that, in evaluating a Bivens claim, the appropriate inquiry is "Bivens
or (only) state law," rather than "Bivens or nothing").
16 Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (Westfall Act),
Pub. L. No. 100-694,

§ 5,

102 Stat. 4563, 4564 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.

§ 2679(b)

(2006)).
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actors.17 They view the Westfall Act as preserving Bivens, but also making it
the sole means of redress for these constitutional violations. This interpretation, Wzquez and Vladeck contend, justifies expanding Bivens, not constraining it." Because the Westfall Act clearly preserved plaintiffs' ability to
sue for constitutional violations, an exclusively federal regime must be
capacious enough to encompass previously available state law remedies. 19
Confining Bivens to a narrower scope supplants Congress's decision to
preserve federal employee liability with a court's decision to limit it.
Moreover, the primary counterweights to Bivens claims-official immunity,
the state secrets privilege, political question doctrine, and the like-are
themselves judge-made law. Courts that constrain Bivens must explain why
they choose to expand those other judge-made doctrines instead. 20
Vzquez and Vladeck accept courts' assertions that the desire to avoid
judicial activism leads them to decline Bivens claims, but they also ask courts
to take their own legal interpretations seriously. The assumption that foreclosing a lawsuit against federal employees is the least dangerous path relies on a
very thin notion of judicial activism 21-one that views opening the courthouse

17 Vizquez & Vladeck, supra note 8, at 566.
18 Id.
19 The House Report accompanying the Act explained that the Act "would not affect the
ability of victims of constitutional torts to seek personal redress from Federal employees." H.R.
REP. No. 100-700, at 6 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5945, 5949-50, cited in Vizquez &
Vladeck, supra note 8, at 514. To "not affect" plaintiffs' ability to sue, the scope ofBivens must be at
least as broad as the scope of the relief available under any law-including state tort law-in effect
at the time of the Act's passage in 1988. Vazquez & Vladeck, supra note 8, at 578. Vazquez and
Vladeck also argue that the usual interpretation of the Westfall Act is wrong. In 1988, plaintiffs
could sue federal employees both under Bivens and at common law. Thus, Vizquez and Vladeck
contend, the Westfall Act preserves not only Bivens remedies, but also state common law remedies
for constitutional violations. Id. at 577-79. The Act preserves individual liability in "a civil action
against an employee of the Government[,] . . . which is brought for a violation of the Constitution of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2). Whether this language preserves actions at
common law depends on whether one construes a common law action as an action "for" a violation of
the federal Constitution, as opposed to "for" a common law tort. Although the House Report
supports Vazquez and Vladeck, their interpretation would be easier to accept had Congress phrased
the provision to exempt not just suits "for" constitutional violations but also suits arising from acts
that violate the Constitution. Their more expansive reading would then better reflect the plain
language of the statute. The standard, narrower reading, however, is also reasonable. It is at least open
to question whether a state law suit would be "for" a constitutional violation absent a state statutory
cause of action available to "persons injured by action under color of federal law that violates the
Constitution"-a so-called "converse-1983" provision. Vazquez & Vladeck, supra note 8, at 537 n.130

(citing Akhil Reed Amar, Uing State Law to Protect Federal ConstitutionalRights: Some Questions and
Answers About Converse-1983, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 159, 160 (1993)).
20 Vizquez & Vladeck, supra note 8, at 530.
21 The concept of judicial activism is famously broad and malleable. See, e.g., Corey Ray-

burn Yung, Flexing JudicialMuscle: An Empirical Study ofJudicial Activism in the Federal Courts,
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door as an action, but closing it as a form of "not-doing."22 The Supreme
Court has warned against expanding Bivens liability without congressional
support, but Congress has left the door for expansion open. Closing that
door, Vizquez and Vladeck point out, is also an act.
I agree that avoiding judge-made law is the primary reason courts give
for dismissing Bivens cases. And I agree that it makes little sense. But,
precisely because it makes so little sense, it can provide only a limited
explanation of the courts' hostility to Bivens.
II.

INSTITUTIONAL INCOMPETENCE:
A FRAMING CHOICE

In addition to citing judicial modesty, courts often point to relative
institutional competence to justify rejecting Bivens claims. Because the
Executive knows more about foreign affairs, military order, and national
security than courts do, the judiciary should yield in these arenas. 23 Yet,
the relative competence of an institution depends largely on what we need
that institution to be competent at. Courts may be less competent than
the Executive at determining the national security implications of a
particular policy. But the question underlying Bivens claims is whether
someone has violated another's constitutional rights. Nobody beats the
courts at answering that question. 24

105 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 10 (2011) (listing thirteen distinct aspects of judicial activism, which have
been noted by various scholars).
22 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 12,5 (2d ed. 1986)
(discussing the "device[] of 'not-doing," which is among the judiciary's "passive virtues").
23 See, e.g., Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 200 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) ("Judges lack
information that executive officials possess . . . Congress and the Commander-in-Chief . . . ,
rather than civilian judges, ought to make the essential tradeoffs, not only because the
constitutional authority to do so rests with the political branches of government but also
because that's where the expertise lies.").
24 Of course, it is an overstatement to say that courts are the only, or even the best,
arbiters of legality. Popular constitutionalism holds that more decentralized views should,
and in practice do, have comparable effects. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 227 (2004) ("Americans in
the past always came to the same conclusion: that it was their right, and their responsibility,
as republican citizens to say finally what the Constitution means."); Robert Post & Reva
Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and judicial Supremacy, 92 CALIF. L. REV.
1027, 1030 (2004) ("[N]o one would accept any version of judicial supremacy that would
prevent citizens from acting to alter the meaning of the Constitution . . . ."). Scholars have
also noted that administrative agencies now interpret law as much as, if not more than,

courts do. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Between Facts and Norms: Agency Statutory Interpretation
as an Autonomous Enterprise, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 497, 499 (2005) ("[Iln [our] legal world[,]
agencies are of necessity the primary official interpreters of federal statutes and . . . that
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Nevertheless, when asked to determine constitutionality, courts often
rephrase the question as one of competence in some other domain, such as
national security or foreign affairs.25 Courts' reluctance to justify this
reframing-or even to acknowledge that it occurs-suggests that they use
the language of competence-and of incompetence -toward a particular
end. 26 After all, competence is not inherent to either a person or an
institution. It emerges, or atrophies, through practices over time. The
Westfall Act's preservation of constitutional damages actions against
federal employees attributes to courts the institutional competence to hear
such claims. If courts disagree with that assessment, it might have less to
do with incompetence than with their unwillingness to bear the responsibility that the Act, and the Constitution, implies.
Circuit courts also appeal to another theory of institutional competence
when rejecting Bivens claims. They note that the Supreme Court has not
expanded Bivens liability in decades, and that individual Justices have
expressed hostility toward Bivens claims. 27 However, the Supreme Court has
also declined many opportunities to eliminate Bivens liability. Perhaps some
Justices are wary of creating a constitutional regime that lacks any way to
effectuate its ostensible guarantee of individual rights. 28 In any event, the
American case law system depends on the articulation of legal reasoning in
judicial opinions, not on winks and nods. For all the Supreme Court's institutional superiority, its reticence hardly presents a convincing legal reason.
Institutional incompetence, though often cited by the courts, provides an unsatisfying explanation of courts' propensity to dismiss Bivens

role has been judicially legitimated as presumptively controlling . . . ."). Even so, it is at
least roughly accurate to say that courts have competence to determine constitutionality.
25 For example, in Arar v. Ashcrojt, the plaintiff alleged that United States employees had conspired to effectuate his torture by the Syrian government. 585 F.3d 559, 566 (2d Ci. 2009). The
Second Circuit refused to recognize a Bivens claim, in part because it would interfere with the
executive policy of extraordinary rendition, which implicates national security and foreign policy
concerns. Id. at 574-75. But the fact that certain acts were taken in the context of a particular policy
cannot determine, legally speaking, whether those acts violated the Constitution. The Arar court thus
refrained a question of constitutionality as a question of national security and foreign policy.
26 Of course, there are doctrines that specifically allow for balancing relative institutional
competence; I address these in the following section.
27 See, e.g., Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 548 (4th Cir. 2012) (explaining that "the
Supreme Court has monitored the limits of judicial competence to design implied remedies" and
has "itself consistently refused to extend Bivens liability to any new context or new category of
defendants" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Vance, 701 F.3d at 198 (noting that, after
recognizing Bivens remedies in three specific contexts, the Supreme Court "has not created
another during the last 32 years").
28 They may be right to be wary. Limited government and the vigorous protection of individual
rights are central pillars of the United States' self presentation, both domestically and internationally.
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claims. Perhaps focusing instead on how courts avoid Bivens claims will
help get at why they do so.
III. CATCH-ALL DOCTRINALISM:
ANALOGICAL REASONING FROM RESULTS
As Vizquez and Viadeck point out, some recent opinions that purport
to dismiss Bivens claims on the ground that a cause of action ought not be
available in fact hang their analysis on other doctrines: immunity, privilege, preemption, 29 state secrets, and political question, among others. I
will refer to this as catch-all doctrinalism.
Here is how catch-all doctrinalism works: Courts determine whether a
constitutional damages claim may be adjudicated on the merits by asking
whether Congress wished to preclude it and whether the plaintiff has
recourse elsewhere. If the claim is precluded or the remedy is redundant,
the case cannot go forward. There are also other situations in which a case
cannot go forward: defendants who have immunity cannot be sued; the
state secrets privilege may bar lawsuits whose revelations would adversely
affect national security; courts may refuse to review certain acts under the
political question doctrine. Catch-all doctrinalism employs concepts such
as immunity, state secrets, and the political question doctrine to answer
unrelated questions about concepts such as causes of action.3 0 The doctrines appear connected because they may all lead to the same result:
precluding the lawsuit. But they are not connected in the way catch-all
doctrinalism suggests, because law's analogical reasoning proceeds from
facts and legal issues, not results.
Vizquez and Vladeck recognize that catch-all doctrinalism can be outcomedeterminative. Had the courts denying Bivens claims considered the proper
doctrines, they "could not have ruled for the defendants merely because of a
disinclination to engage in judicial lawmaking," but would have had to
engage in more wide-ranging interest balancing. 31 There is more at stake as
well. Courts are supposed to reach results by considering facts and legal
issues. Catch-all doctrinalism does the opposite, interpreting facts and
legal issues through the lens of results, and grounding outcomes not on
legal analysis but on judges' intuitions about whether recovery should be
precluded. Rather than treating like cases alike, catch-all doctrinalism
29 Vizquez & Viadeck, supra note 8, at 523-24.
30 Elsewhere, I illustrate how catch-all doctrinalism operates by discussing each irrelevant
doctrine cited in Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, one of the cases Vizquez and Viadeck address.
See Bernstein,supra note 2, at 754-64.
31 Vizquez & Vladeck, supra note 8, at 529-30.
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treats as dispositive cases that address altogether different questions.
Substituting one question for another is more than mere sloppiness. It
violates a basic principle of the rule of law.
Catch-all doctrinalism harms not only the doctrine that it should use,
but also those doctrines that it uses instead. When a court finds a Bivens
action inappropriate because the governing law is unclear,32 it fails in its
duty to clarify the law and further develop the qualified immunity doctrine.33 When a court refuses to hear a case because secret information may be
implicated, it fails to enforce laws specifically designed to balance the Executive's need for secrecy with the adversarial system's need for disclosure. 34
One might defend this approach on efficiency grounds. If all doctrines
lead to the same result, why not get to it as quickly as possible? But a look at
how catch-all doctrinalism actually works refutes this defense. Courts
generally do not perform the doctrinal analysis necessary to determine
whether qualified immunity, the state secrets privilege, political question
doctrine, or other doctrines will eventually preclude a Bivens action. Rather,
they invoke the specter of these doctrines-or the specter of the harms
these doctrines are intended to prevent-to provide an atmospheric analysis
in which the actual doctrine plays little part. 35
Catch-all doctrinalism resembles psychology's "substitution principle,"
in which a mind confronting a difficult question answers an easier one
instead. 36 This principle suggests that judicial laziness-the desire for a
simple analysis-might account for courts' reliance on catch-all doctrinalism.
Yet, the question substituted in Bivens cases is not always easier to answer
32 See, e.g., Arar, 585 F.3d at 580 (declining to recognize a Bivens claim in part because the
situation presents a "complex and rapidly changing legal framework beset with critical legal
judgments that have not yet been made").
33 See Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2031 (2011) ("[If] [c]ourts fail to clarify uncertain questions, fail to address novel claims, fail to give guidance to officials about how to
comply with legal requirements[,] . . . [q]ualified immunity . . . may frustrate the development of constitutional precedent and the promotion of law-abiding behavior." (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
34 See, e.g., Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1-16 (2006 & Supp.
2010) (laying out procedures by which to prevent disclosure of classified information in criminal
proceedings); Arar, 585 F.3d at 605 (Sack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing
the purpose of the state secrets privilege and when that privilege may be invoked); see also 26
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5661, at 416 (1992 & Supp. 2012) (noting that Congress considered and rejected a
rule specifically limiting the use of classified information in civil proceedings).
35 See Bernstein,supra note 2, at 754-64 (explaining how Arar exemplifies this type of analysis).
36 See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 97 (2011) (explaining that
"[ilf a satisfactory answer to a hard question is not found quickly, [individuals] will find a
related question that is easier and will answer it [instead]," without realizing that they are
not, in fact, answering the original question).
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than the question originally posed. A court analyzing qualified immunity,
for example, should not find it difficult to determine whether clearly
established law prohibits federal employees from torturing American
citizens, 7 or detaining individuals in the United States incommunicado
to prevent access to counsel. 8
Looking past the doctrinal muddle reveals that recent opinions rejecting
Bivens claims focus predominantly on prudential, rather than legal, considerations. They stress that the Executive is busy doing a difficult job, and
that individual lawsuits disrupt the efficient performance of that job;3 9 that
national security is of paramount importance; 40 and that individual complaints have no business affecting policy. 41This reasoning suggests that it is
neither doctrinal efficiency nor simplicity that motivates catch-all doctrinalism.
Catch-all doctrinalism is driven by the desirability of the outcome.
CONCLUSION

Professors Vizquez and Vladeck make an important contribution to our
understanding of Bivens in both its federal and its federalist contexts.
They challenge courts to follow through on their own statutory interpretations and claimed goals. If the authors' aim is to make courts less averse to
Bivens claims, 4 2 then I applaud their elucidation of the law and their
exhortation to take its implications seriously.

37 See, e.g., Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 196 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (noting that the
Army Field Manual classifies much of the treatment to which military officers subjected plaintiffs
"as 'physical torture,' 'mental torture' or 'coercion"' (citation omitted)).
38 See, e.g., Arar, 585 F.3d at 566 (noting that the complaint alleged that plaintiff's "attorney

was given false information about [plaintiff's] whereabouts" by defendants).
39 See, e.g., Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 553 (4th Cir. 2012) (noting that, on a practical level, plaintiff's claim "risks interference with military and intelligence operations on a
wide scale"); Vance, 701 F.3d at 199 (observing that "military efficiency depends on a particular
command structure, which civilian judges could mess up without appreciating what they were
doing" (citation omitted)); Arar, 585 F.3d at 574 (determining that plaintiff's suit would
"unavoidably . . . invade[] government interests, enmesh[] government lawyers, and thereby
elicit[] government funds for settlement").
40 See, e.g., Arar,585 F.3d at 575 (explaining courts' traditional reluctance to intrude upon executive authority with regard to national security matters absent express authorization from Congress).
41 See, e.g., Lebron, 670 F.3d at 551 ("[Plaintiff's] complaint seeks quite candidly to have
the judiciary review and disapprove sensitive military decisions made after extensive
deliberations within the executive branch . . . .").
42 See James E. Pfander & David P. Baltmanis, Response, W(h)ither Bivens?, 161 U. PA. L.
REV. ONLINE 231, 248
(2013), http://www.pennlawreview.com/responses/4-2013/Pfander
Baltmanis.pdf (agreeing with Vazquez and Vladeck's goal of restoring a "presumptive recognition
of the right to pursue a Bivens action," despite disputing their statutory interpretation).
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At the same time, I am not convinced, as a matter of analysis, that elucidating the law addresses what courts are actually doing when they reject
Bivens claims. It is difficult to understand these opinions' doctrinal
conflations as simple misreadings of law. They make more sense as
expressions of a policy desire -conscious or not-to protect the Executive
from the individuals it harms. 43
This motivation may be rooted in a number of convictions: the belief
that lawsuits excessively disrupt executive efficiency, and that such efficiency
should override individual rights; the belief that national security requires
an Executive free to act as it thinks it needs to, even if its acts violate
individual rights; 44 the belief that elections provide all the influence an
individual ought to have over executive policy choices. But it is impossible
to make sense of recent Bivens jurisprudence without, in some way, assuming the goal of executive insulation. Evaluating the relevant prudential
concerns-and their relation to institutional realities-may tell us more
about Bivens than the Westfall Act can.

Preferred Citation: Anya Bernstein, Response, Catch-All Doctrinalism
and judicial Desire, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 221 (2013), http://www.
pennlawreview.com/responses/4-2013/Bernstein.pdf.

43 This is not necessarily the same as shielding the Executive against all intrusions. For instance,
one study found that, in noncriminal detention cases arising out of national security projects,
federal courts loath to provide "individualized . . . remedies" nonetheless tend to "grant
injunctive relief that disrupts and reorders the structure of entire government programs." Aziz Z.
Huq, Against NationalSecurity Exceptionalism, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 225, 236.
44 For instance, judges likely share the widely held tendency to accept violations of individual
rights when the salience of terrorism and ethnonational belonging are heightened. See Aziz Z. Huq,
Political Psychology of Counterterrorism, 9 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. SCI. (forthcoming Dec. 2013)
(manuscript at 16) (on file with author) (canvassing psychological literature to conclude that
perceptions of "security threats" tend to elicit "responses in favor of restrictions on liberty").

